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Perception of peasant agriculture as a segment of the 
economy with its own logic, different from the capi-
talist type, is of relative recent date in Latin Ameri-
can literature on agrarian issues. 
Until about 10 years ago, the predominant ap-
proaches were those which focused on dualisms or 
dichotomies (traditional-modern, pre-capitalist or 
feudal-capitalist, stationary-dynamic, and so on), and 
which made no reference as far as theory was con-
cerned to the internal functioning of the so-called 
traditional or pre-capitalist alternative. Neo-classical 
agricultural economics, for its part, was limited to 
applying to the peasant economy a micro-economic 
paradigm which was identical to that of any other 
type of production unit. 
In the present article the author endeavours to 
demonstrate the legitimacy and importance for theo-
ry of the concept of the peasant economy, incorporat-
ing in a single exposition the contributions of various 
writers on the subject. 
A major part of the article is devoted to an analy-
sis of the main features of the internal functioning of 
the peasant economy, in other words, the logic 
which governs decisions on resource allocation in 
that sector. 
Following the analysis of this internal logic, it is 
contrasted with the logic characteristic of commer-
cial or capitalist agriculture, and the position of peas-
ant agriculture in the national economy is shown to 
be closely linked to the special kind of logic which 
governs its operation. 
The article concludes with a brief analysis of the 
forces outside the peasant economy which work to-
wards its break-up, recovery or persistence. 
*The author is a stall member of the CEPAL Mexico 
Office. The article fornis part of a study on the typology of 
producers in rural Mexico, in which the concepts outlined 
here are applied to an empirical analysis of agrarian struc-
ture. 
Introduction 
Until very recently, studies on economic devel-
opment, agrarian structure and the agricultural 
economy in Latin America, whatever the 
school of theory to which their authors sub-
scribed, failed to perceive peasant agriculture 
as a specific and distinct form of organization of 
production. 
Under the approaches derived, to a greater 
or lesser extent, from nineteenth-century liber-
alism and the Ricardian school of political 
economy, the peasantry was a socio-cultural 
remnant of the past —whether termed feudal, 
pre-capitalist or traditional— destined to disap-
pear fairly rapidly as a result of the growth of 
commercial agriculture and manufacturing; for 
that reason, it merited no more consideration as 
a form of production than that involved in anal-
ysis of the mechanisms which encourage or 
hinder its 'modernization'. 
For neo-classical economists, the peasant 
family unit did not constitute a specific object 
of analysis as distinct from the agricultural en-
terprise (or, for these purposes, from any other 
production unit), since as far as the behaviour 
of the producer was concerned, the differences 
they observed could all be attributed to differ-
ent scales of production and differences in the 
relative availability of factors. For that reason, 
decisions concerning what, how and how much 
to produce were considered to be governed, in 
both cases, by the tendency for the ratio be-
tween the marginal productivity and the price 
of each of the 'factors' used to become uniform; 
in other words, the allocation of resources was 
governed by a single type of operating logic. 
The persistence of the peasantry —or, 
more precisely, the fact that the substantial fall 
in numbers forecast by political economy 
seems unlikely to occur within a time scale of 
significance for social analysis and for the for-
mulation of development strategies— as well 
as the inability of neo-classical analysis to ac-
count for a number of salient features of the 
behaviour of the peasant producer,1 have led in 
the past decade to the emergence of an exten-
sive literature devoted to re-examining the 
'Reference is made to several of these features in sec-
tion 1.1. 
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terms in which the peasant question has tradi-
tionally been tackled in economic analysis. 
Two landmarks may be observed in this 
process of re-examination. First, a number of 
critiques have been made since the mid-1960s 
of the dualist propositions of various schools of 
thought, both those founded on the traditional-
modern dichotomy and those drawn up in 
terms of the dichotomy between feudalism and 
capitalism. Second, a tendency has emerged to 
analyse the peasant economy as a sui generis 
form of organizing production, based on the 
'rediscovery' of the writings of the so-called 
'Russian populists' of the 1920s, and particular-
ly those of A. V. Chayanov and his Organization 
of Production school.2 
The criticism of dualism was a factor in 
the abandonment of the view of peripheral so-
cieties as split into two sectors: the traditional, 
pre-capitalist, semi-feudal or feudal sector, re-
garded as a relic of a colonial past, and the 
modern, dynamic or capitalist sector, whose 
task was to 'absorb' and transform the former in 
its image and likeness. 
In opposition to this approach there arose 
the view that both sectors had been formed by a 
single historical process, and that they were 
articulated within a global whole of which both 
formed an integral part, each accounting for the 
other. This involved abandonment of the idea 
of backwardness, and implicit or explicit accep-
tance of the possibility that peasant forms 
2 T h e impact of Chayanov's writings on Western litera-
ture made itself felt surprisingly late, even though one of 
his articles, containing the most important part of his con-
tribution to theory, was published in 1931 by the Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press in a group of papers edited by P. 
Sorokin, C. Zimmerman and C. Galpin (A. V. Chayanov, 
"The Socioeconomic Nature of Peasant Farm Economy", 
in A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology). Never-
theless, neither anthropologists nor economists seem to 
have become aware of Chayanov's importance until the 
mid-1960s. Eric Wolf, who quotes the text mentioned 
above, was one of the first to take up the essence of Chaya-
might persist or even be created as part of a 
dynamic of capitalist development. 
The second of the landmarks mentioned 
earlier —the study of peasant economy, which 
is also the fundamental purpose of this article— 
represents an effort to study an important part 
of the peripheral economies which, having 
been described as 'traditional', had suffered 
from neglect in analysis or had simply been 
assimilated to a single allegedly universal ra-
tionality corresponding to that of the 'maxi-
mizer' of the neo-classical type. 
The central part of the present article falls 
within the context of this latter objective. It 
constitutes an attempt to combine in a single 
formulation the contributions of various writers 
to describing the peasant economy, in an effort 
to demonstrate both the theoretical legitimacy 
and the empirical importance of this concep-
tualization in the formulation of development 
strategies for countries with a substantial peas-
ant sector. 
In addition to analysing the peasant econ-
omy as a specific form of organizing production 
—the principal purpose of the article— we 
shall in the second part sketch the contrast be-
tween the main features of peasant agriculture 
and those characteristic of commercial or capi-
talist agriculture. The article concludes with a 
few considerations on the nature of the inser-
tion or articulation of peasant agriculture with-
in the economy as a whole. 
nov's argument, in his book Peasants (New Jersey, Prentice 
Hall, 1966) (pp. 14 and 15). In the same year, D. Thorner, B. 
Kerblay and R.E.F. Smith published —in addition to a 
biographical analysis of the writer and an assessment of his 
contributions to theory— two of his most important works 
(see A. V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (Ki-
chard D. Irwin, Inc., Illinois, 1966)). It was after the publi-
cation of this book that Chayanov's work became widely 
known both in the English-speaking world and in Latin 
America. 
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I 
The Specific Characteristics of the Peasant Economy 
T h e concept of the peasant economy encom-
passes that sector of domestic agricultural ac-
tivity in which family-type units engaged in the 
process of production with the aim of ensuring, 
from one cycle to another, the reproduction of 
their living and working conditions, or, to put it 
another way, the reproduction of the producers 
and the unit of production itself. Achieving this 
objective means generating, firstly, the means 
of subsistence (biological and cultural) of all 
members of the family, active or not, and sec-
ondly —over and above those needs— a fund 
des igned to pay for the replacement of the 
means of production used in the production 
cycle and to deal with the various eventualities 
which may affect the existence of the family 
group (illness, expenses for formal occasions, 
and so on). 
T h e operating logic applied to the produc-
tive resources available, in other words the 
logic which governs the decisions concerning 
what, how and how much to produce and what 
to do with the product obtained, falls within the 
framework of the objectives described above, 
and gives the peasant economy its own ration-
ality which is distinct from that of commercial 
agriculture. The latter, in contrast, decides 
what, how and how much to produce in such a 
way as to maximize rates of profit and accumu-
lation. In this regard, then, we would appear to 
be faced with two specific and distinct forms of 
social organization of production.3 
3 We shall speak here of forms of organization of pro-
duction (or, more briefly, forms) in order to avoid a debate 
on whether or not the peasant economy is a mode of produc-
tion in the sense in which the term is used in historical 
materialism. Although such a debate might be of impor-
tance as regards some of its theoretical implications, it is not 
germane to the purposes of the present article, which are 
l imited to showing that what is involved is a form of produc-
tion which is different from the commercial form and is 
governed by its own rules. Those interested in the debate 
can consult, for example: R. Bartra, Estructura agraria y 
clases sociales en México (Ed. Era, Mexico City, 1974), who 
considers peasant agriculture as a simple market mode. 
This view is shared by M. Coello, "La pequeña producción 
campesina y la ley de Chayanov", Historia y sociedad, 
No. 8, Mexico City, 1975. J. Tepicht, Marxisme et agricul-
If one postulated the existence of a univer-
sal rationality as regards criteria for the alloca-
tion of resources, and if one considered that 
differences in behaviour between the various 
types of unit should be attributed exclusively to 
differences of scale and of resource availability, 
one would have to classify as purely 'irrational' 
a number of basic, recurrent and empirically 
observable phenomena in areas where the 
peasant economy prevails. 
By way of illustration we might mention 
some of these phenomena, which point to the 
existence of a specific peasant rationality dif-
ferent from the commercial rationality. 
An evaluation of the economic results 
achieved by peasant units over one or more 
cycles, using conventional 'factor cost' con-
cepts, will show in the vast majority of cases 
that these units systematically incur losses. In 
other words, when the costs of this type of unit 
are evaluated, using market prices to impute 
land rent, current wages to estimate the cost of 
family labour used and market prices to impute 
ture: le paysan polonais (Paris, A. Colin, 1973), pp. 13-46, 
regards it as being a mode in its own right. A. Warman 
adopts a similar position in ... Y venimos a contradecir 
{Mexico City, La Casa Chata, 1976), chap. VI. 
Among the critics of the "mode of production" ap-
proach, see H. Bernstein, "Concept for the Analysis of 
Contemporary Peasantries" (mimeo, to be published short-
ly in M.J . Mbiling and C. K. Omari, Peasant Production in 
Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam) or, following a 
different argument, G. Esteva's article "La economía cam-
pesina moderna" (photocopy supplied by the author), 1979. 
In P. Vilar, "La economía campesina", Historia y sociedad, 
No. 15, Mexico City, 1977, we find a notable critique of the 
validity of the concept of the peasant economy. The Journal 
of Peasant Studies (JPS), London, has published a large 
number of articles on the subject of the peasant mode (or 
form); see, for example: J. Ennew, P. Hirst and K. Tribe, 
" 'Peasantry' as an Economic Category", JPS, vol. 4, No. 4 
(July 1977); M. Harrison, "The Peasant Mode of Production 
in the Work of A. V. Chayanov", JPS, vol. 4, No. 4 (July 
1977); D. E. Goodman, "Rural Structure, Surplus Mobiliza-
tion, and Modes of Production in a Peripheral Region: The 
Brazilian North-East" JPS, vol. 5, No. 1 (October 1977), and 
C. D. Scott, "Peasants, Proletarianization and the Articula-
tion of Modes of Production: The Case oí Sugar-cane Cut-
ters in Northern Peru, 1940-1969", JPS, vol. 3, No. 3 (April 
1976). 
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the value of inputs which are not purchased in 
the market, with monetary costs actually in-
curred being added to this total, and when in 
valuing the product the goods sold are added to 
those consumed on the spot, valued at market 
prices, the difference between the value of the 
product and the cost thus calculated is very 
often negative. This type of result, which 
would seem to suggest that "half of mankind is 
today engaged in productive activity which 
registers a continuous deficit, is, nevertheless, 
a sort of reductio ad absurdum"4 and consti-
tutes "an instructive example not of the stupidi-
ty or philanthropy of peasants, but of the mis-
takenness of the belief that there is only one 
economic rationality in all places and at all 
times".5 
T h e ability of peasant units to sell their 
livestock at prices which would in many cases 
signify losses (even with respect to his current 
costs) for an efficient commercial producer fur-
ther testifies to the existence of two different 
ways of valuing resources and products in the 
two types of economy. 
Another phenomenon of this type may be 
observed in the readiness of the peasant tenant 
to pay rents (in cash or in kind) which are gener-
ally higher than those prevailing in capitalist 
forms of letting, without any non-economic 
pressure necessarily being applied. In neo-
classical terms, one might say that the peasant 
is prepared to pay as land rent more than the 
estimated value of the 'marginal product of the 
land' or, in the case of purchases of land, to pay 
for it more than the value of the expected rent, 
discounted at the internal rate of return on capi-
tal which encourages an entrepreneur to in-
vest.6 
Similarly revealing is the presence in some 
areas of peasant units which, while possessing 
productive resources in similar quantities or 
proportions, cultivate their land with different 
4W. Kula, Théorie économique du système féodal, 
quoted by R. Bartra, op. cit., 1973, p. 36. 
5J. Tepicht, op. cit., 1973, p. 36. 
6A. Schejtman, "Elementos para una teoría de la eco-
nomía campesina: pequeños propietarios y campesinos de 
hacienda", El Trimestre Económico, vol. XLII(2), No. 166, 
Mexico City, April-June 1975; republished in Economía 
Campesina (Lima, DESCO, 1979). 
levels of intensity.7 This would appear to reveal 
inefficient or irrational practices on the part of 
some of these producers, who would seem to 
have rejected voluntarily an economic 'opti-
mum' of the neo-classical type. The same judg-
ment would apply to situations of multiple 
cropping (or multiple activity), or where staple 
products occur exclusively despite the possibi-
lity of increasing the product through special-
ization or through inclusion of commercial pro-
ducts involving speculation or risk. 
The examples given above are far from ex-
ceptional in areas of peasant agriculture, and by 
no means exhaust the number of empirical ob-
servations suggesting the existence of a type of 
rationality which is distinct from the commer-
cial rationality and is determined by factors of a 
historical and structural nature, both within 
and outside the units of production, which will 
be examined below in some detail. 
1. The family-based nature of the 
production unit 
The peasant unit is at the same time a unit of 
production and a unit of consumption where 
household activity is inseparable from produc-
tion activity. In this unit, decisions relating to 
consumption are inseparable from those which 
relate to production, and when production is 
embarked upon little or no use is made of (net) 
wage labour. This characteristic, which pro-
vides an explanation for many others, has been 
recognized as being of central importance by 
all writers who have dealt with the subject of 
the peasant economy; they have even pointed 
out that, in many cases, the nuclear or extended 
nature of the family is an integral part of a pro-
duction strategy for survival. 
As early as 1913 studies may be found 
which highlight the phenomenon mentioned 
above and define peasant units as "consumer-
labour enterprises, with the consumer needs of 
the family as their aim and the labour force of 
the family as their means, with no or very little 
7 In areas where the amount of land is very limited, this 
phenomenon may not be manifested very clearly. How-
ever, when the peasant unit faces no major limitations on its 
choice of desirable scales (as in the humid tropics, or in 
areas with extensive stretches of previously unfarmed land 
which has not yet been appropriated by large landown-
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use of wage labour".8 T. Shanin, one of the 
classics of rural sociology, regards the peasant 
unit as "characterized by a nearly total integra-
tion of the peasant family's life and its farming 
enterprise. The family provides the work team 
for the farm, while the farm's activities are gear-
ed mainly to production of the basic consump-
tion needs of the family plus the enforced dues 
to the holders of political and economic pow-
er".9 J. Tepicht shares this view: "in our model 
the grounding in the family signifies a symbio-
sis between the agricultural enterprise (ferme) 
and the household economy (ménage)".10 Cha-
yanov states that "in the family economic unit, 
which makes no use of hired labour, the com-
position and size of the family is one of the main 
factors in the organization of the peasant eco-
nomic unit"." 
The division of labour within the family 
unit is effected on the basis of differences of age 
and sex, and is frequently governed by custom 
as regards men's work and women's work, The 
implications of this attitude to work are ana-
lysed below.12 
2. The irrevocable commitment to the family 
labourforce 
The entrepreneur can regulate the labour force 
in his unit of production at will —if we leave 
ers), differences of scale may be observed which cannot be 
explained in terms of the availability of other complemen-
tary resources (labour force, tools, and so on) but must be 
attributed to objectives different from those which enter 
into the definition of economic 'optima'. 
HT. Shanin, "A Russian peasant household at the turn 
of the century", in T. Shanin, éd., Peasants and Peasant 
Societies (Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin, 1971), p. 30, 
quoting a Russian encyclopaedia published in 1913. 
Hkid. 
" 'Tepicht illustrates this by citing a region of Algeria 
(Zeribe) where a study of 'the joint property type" (of the 
old extended families) indicates an almost complete ab-
sence of mixed' situations of joint production activity and 
separate kitchens, or vice versa. Either the couples join 
together in work in the fields and at the table, or they sepa-
rate and become modernized both in the fields and at the 
table (even if they live under the same root). Op. cit., pp. 23-
24. 
1 'Chayanov, 1974, op. cit. Chayanov even comes to see 
in the family structure (size, ages, sexes) the principal ele-
men t of economic differentiation; we do not share this 
view, as is indicated below at the beginning of the section 
on differentiation. 
l 2 The great flexibility which may be observed in this 
aside legal restrictions—as the market dictates. 
In contrast, the head of the family in a peasant 
unit takes as his starting point the family labour 
force available and has to find productive em-
ployment for all its members. S. H. Franklin, in 
an important study on the European peasant-
ry13 highlights this commitment as the central 
feature of the peasant unit: "The head of the 
peasant unit (chef d'entreprise) lacks the free-
dom of action (of the capitalist entrepreneur) to 
regulate the labour force. His labour force is 
made up of his relations ("kith and kin")... and 
engaging and dismissing them in accordance 
with the dictates of some external regulatory 
mechanism would be at once inhuman, imprac-
tical and irrational. Inhuman because only in 
exceptional circumstances is it possible to find 
alternative job opportunities. Impractical be-
cause the members of his labourforce, as mem-
bers of the family, have a right to a share in the 
ownership of the means of production ... Irra-
tional because the objectives of the undertak-
ing are first and foremost genealogical, and 
only secondarily economic, since the task of the 
"chef is to maximize the labour input rather 
than profit or any other indicator of efficien-
cy".14 
The graph below clearly shows the impli-
cations of this feature, as well as others which 
will be referred to below, but which Franklin 
seems to have missed. 
The shaded areas in the graph include sets 
of observations on the intensity of labour (hours 
per year per hectare) for units of different area 
with different numbers of standard labour 
symbiosis between the undertaking and the family is illus-
trated by A. Warman with reference to the Zapata period: 
"as access to the land controlled by the hacienda became 
more difficult, the extended family gained strength as the 
most efficient unit for securing an independent supply of 
maize and raising wage incomes to cover subsistence for 
the peasants. It was the only form of organization which 
made it possible to survive and maintain the men in fight-
ing condition". Op. cit., 1977, p. 307. 
1:ÎS. H, Franklin, The European Peasantry (London, 
Methuen, 1969). 
1 4Tbe expression "maximize the labour input" is am-
biguous; strictly one should speak of maximizing the input 
of productive labour, that is, labour which generates in-
creases in net income, and not labour in general. 
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Source: S.H. Franklin, op. cit., p. 17, where he eitos the results of a field study 
by Van Deeren(1964). 
units.15 The ranges should be read as follows: 
the (shaded) upper set includes observations 
on units covering less than 10 hectares; the next 
on units of be tween 10 and 20 hectares, and so 
on until the last, which includes observations 
on units covering more than 50 hectares. 
It may be noted that what Franklin calls 
the "labour commitment of the chef d'entre-
prise" is reflected in the fact that, for a given 
range of areas, there is a tendency to raise the 
number of working days per hectare as the 
number of labour units increases. In contrast, 
what is not given sufficient prominence by 
Franklin is that for each level of size and num-
ber of labour units there is a whole range of 
labour intensities per hectare which tends to be 
broader as the size of the unit declines. This, as 
we shall see below, suggests that among the 
units in a single area category and with the 
same number of labour units, the number of 
consumers per labour unit may vary. 
3. Labour intensity and Chayanov's Law 
T h e intensity with which factors are used 
—given a certain availability of factors and a 
1,15We assume that "standard labour units", which is the 
variable used by Franklin, implies that the various catego-
ries of worker in the unit have been reduced to a homoge-
neous unit, using criteria which are unfortunately not clear, 
certain technological level— is determined by 
the degree to which requirements for the re-
production of the family and the unit of produc-
tion, including debts or undertakings to third 
parties, are met. 
Generally, and all other things being 
equal, there will be a tendency to intensify 
labour as the ratio of dependents to labour units 
rises. In other words, for equal resources (land 
and means of production), the number of work-
ing days per hectare will tend to rise with the 
ratio between consumers who have to be sup-
ported and family labour available. On the 
other hand, if the amount of land available in-
creases, the number of working days per hec-
tare will tend to fall, all other things being 
equal . In this regard, it may be said that within 
the technology range characteristic of the peas-
ant economy, the dominant form of substitution 
is be tween land and labour (operating in both 
directions), in contrast to commercial agricul-
ture, where the dominant substitution is that 
which tends to occur between capital and la-
bour and between capital and land.16 
The 'rules' for intensification mentioned 
above can be represented more clearly using a 
simplified graphic model (Figure 2)17 where 
resources (land, means of production, labour 
force, and so on) and technology are of a given 
magnitude and are common to all the family 
units represented, with variations only in the 
number of the consumers which each unit must 
support. These consumers are represented in 
terms of an 'average consumer', in standard 
consumer units (Uc) into which the different 
age and sex groups of the family members have 
been converted. This variable (Uc) is repre-
sented in the graph as a downward projection of 
the horizontal axis. The horizontal axis proper 
(Uc) indicates the available family labour, stand-
ardized and expressed in man-hours per year. 
If we assume that available working days 
are greater than OY, which is the point of great-
est intensity (or the point where the marginal 
product of labour, measured in terms of grain, 
would become zero), the minimum point of 
intensity (man-hours per year per unit of area) 
16J. Tepicht, op. cit., pp. 24 and 26. 
17Taken from A. Schejtman, op. cit. 
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will depend on Uc, increasing in the same di-
rection as Uc. For Uc = 4, the hours of labour 
will be OX; Jor Uc = 5 they will rise to OZ, and 
so on up to OY for Uc = 9, where the minimum 
intensity required and the maximum intensity 
possible will coincide. 
In this case (Uc = 9), the product required 
to satisfy consumption by this unit is equal to 
OC, which is the maximum possible in the light 
of the land, means of production and techno-
logy available. For all the other cases (Uc < 8) 
the minimum aceptable intensity would be de-
termined, in the sense, for example, that a fami-
ly with Uc = 4 has to perform at least OX work-
ing days; but beyond this point, and up to OY, 
determination of the specific level of intensity 
—what Chayanov calls the "self-exploitation of 
the labour force"— would be established on 
the basis of the ratio between the satisfaction of 
needs which exceed minimum needs and the 
shortage of additional labour required to meet 
Figure 2 
Output 
(Tons of grain) 
o :. 
i 
(Man-hours pfr year) 
- * • - - * -
6 7 8 9 U„ 
OM = Consumption requirements per consumption unit. 
OS = Function of family consumption requirements = OM.Uc 
OP = Production function - f (Ut, T, MP) where: 
Ut = man-hours per year of labour performed (Ut < 0Y) 
T = constant arable area 
MP= means of production and technology (given and constant) 
Fuente: Schejtman, A., op.cit., 1975. 
them.18 It is unnecessary to point out that when 
resources are insufficient (Uc > 9 in the exam-
ple), not only will the intensity used be the 
maximum possible, but in addition it will be 
necessary to seek additional employment in 
order to secure an income which will ensure 
the reproduction of the family and the unit of 
production, or else face its deterioration or 
break-up.19 
Since in general the situation of peasant 
units is at or near the point of maximum intensi-
ty, the margin for subjective considerations re-
garding the marginal utility of products and the 
marginal disutility of effort, which are of cen-
tral importance in Chayanov's argument, is 
narrow enough to be irrelevant in practice and 
to permit determination of the level in terms 
which lead one to consider that the peasant unit 
tends to seek to raise its income as much as 
possible, regardless of the effort involved:20 "In 
contrast to the capitalist, who does not commit 
funds if he is not assured of a rate of profit at 
least in proportion to them, and also in contrast 
to the wage earner, who for each hour of over-
time will demand as much as, or more than, he 
demands for ordinary working hours, the 'per-
sonnel' of a family farm are prepared to con-
tribute additional labour to raise their overall 
income, which [given the operation of the law 
of diminishing returns - A.S.] will be remuner-
ated at a lower price, reducing the average va-
lue of their collective 'pay' ".21 
4. The partially market-oriented nature of 
peasant output 
Peasant economy ceases to be a 'natural' eco-
nomy, or one of on-the-spot consumption, or 
self-sufficiency, from the moment when a vary-
1«A. V. Chayanov, op. cit., 1974, p. 84. 
l yA. Wartnan (op. cit., 1976, p . 326) sets out this 'law' as 
follows: "Once subsistence requirements have been met, 
the peasant stops producing. Firstly, the diminishing re-
turns from the more intensive activity mean that any addi-
tional income over the subsistence minimum demands a 
disproportionate increase in activity. Secondly, incorpora-
tion in the capitalist market means that any rise in income 
leads to a rise in the transfer of surpluses". Warman also 
introduces the problem of subordination, to which we shall 
refer below. 
20J. Tepicht, op. cit., p. 41. 
211 bid., p. 35. 
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ing proportion of the material requirements for 
its reproduction, whether inputs or final con-
sumption goods, must be acquired in the mar-
ket, using money. For this purpose, the family 
unit is forced to join the market for goods and 
services as a supplier of products and/or of la-
bour power. 
However, in contrast to a United States 
farmer or any other kind of family undertaking 
of a commercial nature, the family unit general-
ly comes to market in its capacity as a producer 
of use values (to use the classical terminology) 
and not of products which have been defined a 
priori as commodities, unless elements of ex-
ternal compulsion so dictate. In other words, 
the decision concerning what to produce is not 
based on the marketability of the product, but 
on its role in supporting the family and the 
production unit. 
Frequently, even the manner of selling 
what has been produced reflects this feature of 
the peasant economy. Thus, when the product 
or products sold are the same as those which 
feature in the basic diet (maize, beans, wheat 
and so on), the peasant does not, at the time of 
the harvest, identify how much will be sent to 
market and how much will be consumed on the 
spot, but takes out for sale small parts of what 
has been harvested as the need arises for pur-
chases and payments. Only on an ex post basis 
is it possible to reconstruct how much has been 
sold and distinguish it from what has been con-
sumed on the spot. Only the presence of ex-
ternal constraints —either of an ecological na-
ture (such as the fact that cultivation of basic 
grains is impossible)22 or of a socioeconomic 
nature (such as the existence of land earmarked 
by law for a specific purpose)— or the existence 
22An interesting example of an ecological constraint is 
furnished by certain forms of co-ownership of livestock 
observed in the Mexican humid tropics, where, as a result 
of the fact that the peasants find it impossible to continue 
with agriculture based on felling, clearing and burning 
—because the pressure of numbers on the land does not 
permit renewal of the plant cover required for this prac-
tice— a system ot co-ownership has arisen between private 
stock raisers and ejidatarios, whereby the former concen-
trate on fattening and the latter on breeding. The cattle 
belong to the stock raiser, and the ejidatarios are entitled to 
half the calves (normally the females) and to the milk, in 
exchange for the use oí their pastures and their care ot the 
livestock under the co-ownership agreement. In these cir-
of advances or borrowings which give the cre-
ditor power to take decisions concerning the 
crops will prevent the full expression of the 
partially market-oriented nature of peasant out-
put. 
Obviously, the more the peasant unit de-
pends on purchased inputs and goods for its 
reproduction, the greater (other things being 
equal) will be the role which market considera-
tions play in decisions on what and how to 
produce. 
It may be deduced from the above that we 
do not subscribe to the characterization of the 
peasant economy as a 'simple mercantile eco-
nomy' adopted by various writers,23 since, al-
though we agree that the aim of this type of 
economy is to reproduce its component units, 
we feel that the internal operating logic is not a 
purely market-oriented logic, such as that 
which would be applied by a Western farmer or 
craftsman. At the same time, to quote Tepicht, 
in the context of the theory from which the 
description "simple mercantile economy" has 
been taken, the latter "is but the embryo of the 
capitalist economy", while the 'historical voca-
tion' of the peasant economy appears to be very 
different from this role, in so far as this type of 
economy persists not only in many formations 
of a capitalist type, but even in those of a socia-
lists type, as will be emphasized below.24 
5. The indivisibility of the family income 
At the beginning of the article it was pointed 
out that when evaluating the results of the eco-
nomic activity of peasant units, conventional 
economic analyses 'discovered' deficit situa-
tions in most cases. This was the result of apply-
ing to such units accounting categories identi-
cal to those applied to commercial agriculture, 
where rent, wages and profit are an objective 
cumstances, the milk, which is sold or is made into cheese 
for sale, comes to play part of the role of maize, and the 
female calves the role which livestock normally plays in 
peasant agriculture: a savings fund and an illusory form of 
accumulation. 
2;JSee footnote 3 for author references. The term "sim-
p l e " is used by these writers to describe a situation where 
there is no accumulation of surpluses nor any increase in 
the production capacity of the units over time. 
2 1J. Tepicht, op. cit., p. 18. 
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reality. For this purpose, the analyses imputed 
market values to the effort made by the peasant 
and his family within their own unit, conferring 
on him the dual character of entrepreneur and 
wage earner and thus creating a schizoid being 
who, if he pays himself the current wage in his 
capacity as a wage earner, is guilty of irrational 
or philanthropic behaviour as an entrepreneur, 
since he not only fails to secure the average 
profit but suffers systematic losses in the 'capi-
tal' advanced; if, on the other hand, the average 
profit is imputed to him as remuneration for his 
entrepreneurial activities, he is cheating him-
self as a wage earner, by failing to allocate him-
self even a reproduction wage. 
In contrast to this fiction, which we feel 
throws no light on the motivations of the peas-
ant as a producer, the important categories are 
those which have an objective existence or 
which are capable of being objectified on the 
basis of the concrete behaviour of the units. 
In this regard, the result (and the aim) of 
the economic activity of the family unit is the 
total family income (gross or net, in cash and in 
kind) derived from the joint efforts of its mem-
bers, in which it is not possible to separate the 
part of the product attributable to rent from that 
attributable to wages or profits.25 
6. The non-transferable nature of a portion of 
family labour 
O n e of the special features of the peasant unit is 
that it makes use of labour power which would 
not be in a position to create value in other 
production contexts. We refer both to the work 
of children, old people and women and to the 
unsystematic use of the spare time of the head of 
the family and his adult children of working 
age. This is one of the reasons for the ability of 
2 3See A. V. Chayanov, 1966, op. cit., pp. 2-5, and J. 
Tepicht , op. cit., p. 36. Perhaps the only virtue of the fiction 
referred to above is to show that peasant units are prepared 
to supply their products at prices below those which a 
capitalist producer would demand in order to pay current 
wages and rents and obtain at least the average profit. 
However, the reasons why this occurs are totally obscured 
by this form of evaluation or calculation. K. Ilartra, in his 
study on Mexican agrarian structure (líartra, op. cit., 
pp. 58-66), makes use of the categories of wage, rent and 
profit in the manner indicated. 
the family unit to bring products to the market 
at prices markedly lower than those required to 
stimulate commercial production. 
According to Tepicht, peasant labour "is 
composed of at least two qualitatively different 
parts, both because of the nature of the forces it 
uses (some transferable to other economic sec-
tors and others not), and because of the natural 
character of its products and the labour remu-
neration which is concealed in the prices at 
which they can be sold".2fi In other words, 
"what the peasant unit is in a position to pro-
duce with marginal forces in exchange for a 
marginal payment requires a completely differ-
ent estimate by society (the market) if one con-
siders the labour force required for this type of 
output".27 
This is so much so that even in countries 
with centrally planned economies one may ob-
serve that, in collective units, the ratio between 
payments per working day devoted to livestock 
raising and payments per working day devoted 
to crop farming is greater than 1, whereas the 
implicit ratio (as indicated by the prices of the 
products concerned) in the peasant units is sub-
stantially less than l.28 
This ability to make use of the marginal 
labour force (that is to say, to convert it into 
products) may also be extended to land in the 
sense that areas which are marginal for com-
mercial agriculture because of their extremely 
low productive potential —in other words, 
areas which are not even regarded as resources 
by commercial agriculture— can nevertheless 
support the peasant family, since the family 
regards any element which is capable of con-
tributing to a net increase in the family income^ 
as a resource for as long as its reproduction 
requirements remain unsatisfied and there 
exists a margin within which its labour can pro-
ductively be intensified. 
A. Warman refers very lucidly to this phe-
nomenon: "the peasant family in a capitalist 
society is first and foremost a unit which pro-
duces using unpaid labour. The labour of chil-
dren and women, which is the object of very 
2(iJ. Tepicht, op, cit., pp. 39-40. 
21 Ibid., p. 38. 
2Hlbid., pp. 36-37. 
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limited circulation as a commodity in capitalist 
Mexico, is one of the most important compo-
nents of the peasant product. Women and chil-
dren contribute thousands of working days 
which are invested in the independent produc-
tion of peasants, in addition to performing work 
which is not strictly productive but which re-
duces outgoings and makes it possible to con-
t inue living with incomes which in statistical 
terms would be not just insufficient, but down-
right ridiculous".29 Elsewhere he writes that 
"looking after livestock demands more energy 
than it yields, but this energy is distributed over 
a longer period and in units of low intensity 
which can be entrusted to people who cannot 
fully participate in labour during the critical 
period because they have little physical energy 
(such as children or old people) or who carry 
out other occupations at the same time (such as 
women). Owning livestock proves to be ra-
tional: it is like borrowing energy which is paid 
back with interest, but in instalments which 
can be paid by those without a full-time oc-
cupation in farming".30 
7. The special type of risk internalization 
For an entrepreneur, at least in theoretical 
terms, the risk or uncertainty which attach to 
the profits that can be derived from alternative 
applications of his capital are viewed in the 
decision-making process as probability func-
tions which prompt him to seek at least a 
degree of proportionality between profit and 
risk. In the case of the peasant, his vulnerability 
to the effects of an adverse result is so extreme 
that, following Lipton31, it seems appropriate to 
take the view that his behaviour as a producer is 
guided by a kind of'survival algorithm' which 
leads him to avoid risks despite the potential 
profits which would arise if he accepted them. 
Lipton states that, while a well-off American 
farmer may prefer a 50% probability of obtain-
ing US$ 5,000 or US$ 10,000 to the certainty of 
obtaining US$ 7,000, an Indian farmer who is 
29A. Wannan, op. cit., p. 310. 
;«'/bif/. ,p.298. 
•'" M. Lipton, "The Theory of the Optimizing Peasant", 
Journal of Development Structures, vol. IV (April 1968), 
pp. 327-351. 
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offered a choice between a 50% probability of X 
rupees or 1,000 rupees and the certainty of 
700 rupees per year, with which he can barely 
feed his family, cannot put X much below 700.32 
T h e way peasant units thus internalize risk 
and uncertainty is another of the reasons that 
he lp to explain the persistence of cropping 
methods which, though they generate lower 
incomes, lessen the variability of the expected 
values of output. These considerations also ex-
plain why peasants will not consider growing 
certain crops which produce a higher yield per 
unit area, but which are subject to substantial 
variations in prices or involve a complex mar-
keting mechanism.33 
8. Labour-intensive technology 
The need to take maximum advantage of the 
most abundant resource (the labour commit-
ment referred to in the previous paragraph) and 
the existence of unfavourable terms of trade for 
peasant products in the overall or local market 
give rise to a tendency to reduce the purchase 
of inputs and means of production to the lowest 
possible level. As a result, the intensity of 
means of production per worker, or of pur-
chased inputs per unit of product or per work-
ing day, are generally well below those of com-
mercial or capitalist agriculture. In this regard, 
the decision on what to produce seems to be 
guided by the criterion of maximizing labour 
power per unit of product generated and/or mi-
nimizing purchased or hired inputs and means 
of production. 
9. Membership of a landgroup 
In contrast to an agricultural enterprise, the 
peasant unit cannot be viewed as a unit sepa-
:®Ibid., p. 345. 
:î;ïAn intuitive approach, corroborated by some empiri-
cal evidence, indicates a certain correlation between the 
value (and degree of liquidity) of the assets the peasant 
owns and his ability to take risks, either by adding crops 
and/or techniques which, although more profitable, are 
also more risky than the traditional ones, or by specializing 
in some of the traditional crops instead of maintaining the 
pattern of a larger number of crops occupying small areas, 
which is characteristic of the poor peasant. In this regard, 
livestock destined for breeding, the principal form of sav-
ing, fulfils the function of insurance against poor harvests or 
THE PEASANT ECONOMY / A. Schejtman 125 
rate from other similar units, but always ap-
pears as part of a larger grouping of units with 
which it shares a common territorial base:34 
what A. Pearse defines as the landgroup, which 
consists of "a group of families forming part ofa 
larger society and living in permanent interde-
pendence interaction, and propinquity by vir-
tue of a system of arrangements between them 
for the occupation and productive use of a sin-
gle land area and the physical resources it con-
tains, from which they gain their livelihood".35 
J. Tepicht, for his part, calls this social context 
the "protective shell of the family economy".36 
T h e very reproduction of the peasant fami-
ly unit depends in many cases on the complex 
system of non-market exchanges conducted 
with a greater or lesser degree of reciprocity 
within the landgroup. Even the survival or de-
cline of the family units frequently depends on 
the degree of cohesion which the landgroup 
maintains in the face of limitations on its scope 
for survival, generally arising from the devel-
opment of commercial agriculture. 
In fact, as is emphasized below, the pene-
tration and development of market relations 
progressively weaken the role of the landgroup 
in the cycle of social reproduction of the family 
units, with the result that this reproduction oc-
curs on an increasingly individual basis, which 
is unquestionably less secure. 
Despi te the crucial importance which the 
landgroup has had and continues to have in 
accounting for the persistence of the peasantry, 
the adverse result oi a risk taken, so that those who possess 
most livestock are most prepared to introduce innovations 
in cropping patterns or methods. A. Schejtman, Hacienda 
and Peasant Economy, degree thesis, University ot Oxford, 
1970, chap. IV. 
' ' 'We have avoided the term "rural or local communi-
ty" which is used so frequently in the literature, since it 
implicitly contains the idea that the group in question 
shares common interests, which is not always the case, and 
raises "an empirical problem which should not be intro-
duced into the definition" of these groupings. D. Lehman, 
On the Theory of Peasant Economy (photocopy provided 
by the author), p. 15; and H. Mendras, (¡noted by J. Tepicht, 
op. cit., p. 22. 
•i5A. Pearse, The Latin American Peasant (London, 
Frank Cass, 1975), p . 51 . This is identical to the concept 
used by Warman in Los campesinos hijos predilectos del 
régimen (Mexico City, Nuestro Tiempo, 1972), p. 145, 
when he speaks of a "group which shares a common terri-
torial base" . 
l(\J. Tepicht, op. cit., p. 20. 
and despite the importance it should have 
when any rural development strategy based on 
the peasantry is being drawn up, there has very 
often been a tendency to restrict analysis of the 
peasant economy to analysis of the family unit. 
A. Warman, in contrast, emphasizes that "it is 
obvious that the family cannot remain in a posi-
tion to produce without capital and without 
opportunities to accumulate and cannot subsist 
without reserves or savings, in an environment 
dominated by capitalist relationships, without 
the support of a larger grouping which fur-
nishes conditions of stability in this contradic-
tory situation. In the case of Mexico, the larger 
grouping takes the form of the agrarian com-
munity, in which one may observe on a broader 
and more complex, though still partial, scale 
the production relations of the peasant econ-
omy".37 
10. Commercial agriculture: principal 
contrasts 
By way of concluding this first chapter it seems 
appropriate to outline the principal features of 
commercial agriculture so that we can contrast 
them, albeit in general terms, with those which 
have been highlighted as being characteristic 
of the peasant economy. 
A description of this sector does not call for 
a very detailed conceptual effort, since —given 
the level of abstraction in this chapter— its 
principal features are only too well known; ref-
erence has already been made to some of them 
when contrasting them with those of the peas-
ant economy. Accordingly, it will be sufficient 
to point out that in commercial units there is a 
clear separation between capital and labour 
power, and that as a result profit, wages and 
even land rent are categories which are the 
objective expression of relations between 
owners of means of production, landowners 
and sellers of labour power. 
Kinship relations are completely divorced 
from production relations; in other words, what 
we have called the commitment to the labour 
force does not exist. 
T h e relations between units are regulated 
:i7A. Warman, <>/>. cit., 1976, p. 311; sec also p. 325. 
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by universal market laws in which there is no 
place for exchanges based on reciprocity, or, to 
put it another way, on considerations of com-
munity and kinship. 
Production is exclusively market-oriented 
(though for some crops a margin is left to allow 
for internal consumption or use as inputs with-
in the unit), in the sense that decisions on what 
and how to produce are completely unrelated 
to what the producers and their families con-
sume. 
Considerations of risk and uncertainty 
arise strictly in terms of probabilities, in the 
sense that they are internalized in the decision-
making process as ratios between magnitudes 
of profit expected and probabilities associated 
with each magnitude. 
The principal aim of production, and ac-
cordingly the criterion used to determine what 
to produce, how much, how and for what pur-
pose, is to secure at least average profit, which 
is destined for accumulation (and, of course, 
consumption by the entrepreneurs). 
The contrast between the two forms of so-
cial organization of production referred to is 
represented diagramatically in the table below. 
Purpose of produc-
tion 
Peasant agriculture Commercial agriculture 
Reproduction of the producers 
and the production unit 
Maximization of the rate of 
profit and capital accumulation 
Origin of the labour 
force 
Basically the family and, on 
occasion, reciprocated loans 
from other units; exceptionally, 
marginal quantities of wage 
labour 
Wage labour 
Commitment of the 
head to the labour 
force 
Absolute Non-existent, apart from legal 
requirements 
Technology Very labour-intensive; low 
intensity of 'capital' and of 
purchased inputs 
Greater capital intensity per 
labour unit and higher propor-
tion of purchased inputs in the 
value of the final product 
Destination of the 
product and origin of 
inputs 
The market, in part The market 
Criterion for inten-
sification of labour 
Maximum total product, even 
at the cost of a fall in the average 
product. Limit: nil marginal 
product 
Marginal productivity > wage 
Risk and uncertainty Assessment not based on prob-
abilities; 'survival algorithm' 
Internalization based on proba-
bilities, in the search for rates of 
profit proportional to risk 
Nature of the labour 
force 
Makes use of non-transferable 
or marginal labour 
Uses only transferable labour 
on the basis of skills 
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Peasant agriculture Commercial agriculture 
Components of net Indivisible family product or Wage, rent and profit, exclu-
income or product income, realized partially in sively in the form of money 
kind 
II 
Articulation and Break-up of Peasant Agriculture 
So far we have restricted ourselves to analysing 
the rules which govern the internal operation 
of the peasant economy, and the differences 
which emerge from a comparison with those 
applying to commercial agriculture. We will 
now consider the way in which these character-
istics influence the position of the peasant eco-
nomy in the national society of which it is part. 
1. The concept of articulation 
We consider the concept of articulation of dif-
ferent forms of social organization of produc-
tion —the peasant and the capitalist forms— to 
be of central importance in classifying the phe-
nomena which we wish to examine. 
By articulation we mean the relationships 
(or system of relationships) which link the sec-
tors in question one with another and with the 
rest of the economy, forming an integrated 
whole (the economic system) whose structure 
and dynamics are determined by (and in turn 
determine) the structure and dynamics of the 
parts.38 
Articulation takes the form of exchanges of 
goods and services (or values) between sectors : 
exchanges which are characterized by their 
)f ,This concept is used by many writers in a sense very 
close to that given it in this paragraph. Examples are J. 
Bengoa, "Economía campesina y acumulación capitalista", 
Economía campesina, op. cit., pp. 251-286; H. Bartra, op. 
cit., pp. 79-87; A. Warman, op. cit., pp. 324-337; G. Oliver, 
Hacia una jundamentación analítica para una nueva es-
trategia de desarrollo rural (photocopy) (Mexico City, 
CIDKR, 1977), pp. 176-199. 
asymmetry39 (or lack of equivalence), and 
which lead to transfer of surpluses from the 
peasant sector to the rest of the economy, as a 
result of a form of integration in which the peas-
ant economy sector is subordinated to the re-
maining elements in the structure (capitalist 
agriculture and the urban-industrial complex).40 
Although this articulation is expressed or 
becomes visible at the level of the market rela-
tions between sectors —in the markets for pro-
ducts, inputs, labour and even land— the terms 
of this exchange, or its asymmetrical nature, 
3 9 The term "asymmetry" was used by Warman (op. 
cit., 1976, p . 325), in a sense similar to that which we are 
using here, in order to contrast (symmetrical) relationships 
within the peasant community with those which arise be-
tween that community and the rest of society. "In the peas-
ant mode of production the internal relationships are ori-
ented towards symmetry, towards reciprocity, in order to 
make it possible to ensure the subsistence of the families, 
the smallest efficient units in the grouping. The community 
is the context through which flow the relationships ofrecí; 
procity which play the role of redistributing resources, 
flexibly transmitting the use of the means which make 
agricultural production, the basic activity of this mode, 
possible. Among the different peasant communities the 
symmetrical relationship is realized through the direct ex-
change of complementary goods by the producers them-
selves. In order for the resources to be exchanged symme-
trically, they must be under the independent command and 
control of the peasants, whether or not they are formally 
recognized as their possessions." We shall see below when 
analysing the phenomenon of peasant differentiation, how 
the loss of independent control over their conditions oi 
reproduction leads to the emergence of asymmetrical rela-
tionships even within the landgroup. 
4 0In order to define this form of articulation, some 
writers have adopted the term "subsumption", which en-
compasses the concepts of integration and subordination 
(G. Esteva, op. cit., p . 4). 
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cannot be explained at this level, but originate 
in differences at the level of the process of 
production, i.e., the level of the forms of pro-
duction or differences in the operating logic 
specific to each of the sectors. 
We shall first consider the main forms of 
articulation, and then examine how the nature 
of each form may be 'explained', in the final 
analysis, in terms of differences in the process 
of production. 
2. Articulation in the market for products 
An initial form of articulation, or, to express it 
differently, of exploitation of peasant agricul-
ture, is that which arises in the market for prod-
ucts to which the peasant comes to sell part of 
his output and to buy inputs and final goods 
which he requires for his reproduction. There 
the terms of trade, or the relative prices of what 
he buys and what he sells, are and always have 
been systematically unfavourable to him. Re-
gardless of the fact that the terms of trade may 
record improvements in a specific period and 
with respect to a base year, there is a sort of 
'primordial ' undervaluation of peasant prod-
ucts which is inherent in the very structure of 
relative prices (as between peasant production 
and capitalist production), formed over genera-
tions, on which the reproduction of the eco-
nomy as a whole is crucially dependent be-
cause of the well-known relationship between 
food prices, wage levels and the rate of profit.41 
Although the extent of inequality in ex-
change —in other words, the magnitude of the 
surplus transferred from the peasant sector to 
the rest of society through the above-mention-
ed mechanism— can rise or tall depending on 
the greater or lesser bargaining power (social 
power in the market) which each party can 
exert in the market relationship, its origin lies 
in the internal logic of production in each sec-
tor, and not in the market relationships, al-
though this is where it is expressed. 
The 'secret' which makes unequal ex-
change possible is to be found in the readiness 
of peasant agriculture to produce at prices 
4 IJ . Tepicht, "Economía contadina e teoría marxista", 
Crítica marxista, No. 1, Rome, 1967, p. 76. 
lower than those which a capitalist producer 
would require in order to do so in the same 
conditions, since while it is sufficient for the 
former to meet the requirements for the repro-
duction of the labour force employed and the 
fund for the replacement of the means of pro-
duction used, the latter sector requires in addi-
tion a profit which is at least equal to the average 
profit in the economy. 
If, to simplify, we assume that the labour 
force employed in the two cases is the same, 
that the cost of its reproduction is covered by 
wages, that the inputs purchased are the same 
in both cases and that the peasant's replace-
ment fund is equal to the entrepreneur's depre-
ciation, the difference in the prices at which 
each will be prepared to produce will be the 
average profit, if they pay the same rent, or the 
profit plus land rent if both own the land.42 
"The small peasant landowner behaves 
nei ther like the owner of property nor like the 
capitalist entrepreneur. As a matter of principle 
he is obliged to produce regardless of condi-
tions on the market, or he will fail to survive. 
Immediately he contents himself with the 
equivalent of a wage, without raising the ques-
tion of rent, or even the question of profit. The 
small peasant behaves exactly like a wage-paid 
piece-worker."'13 
This is precisely why peasant agriculture 
may be found in areas (marginal lands) and in 
lines of products where capitalist undertakings 
would be uneconomic. 
This is the phenomenon which lies at the 
very foundation of the formation of the price 
4 2Land rent (imputed or actually paid} will have to I>e 
added to profit if we compare a peasant landowner with an 
entrepreneur landowner, since while the tonner would be 
prepared to overlook the value of this rent, or (to express it 
more clearly) to view it as an integral part of his total 
'reproduction' income, the latter will demand a return 
equivalent to that on his other capital. 
43K. Vergópoulos, "Capitalismo disforme", in S. Amin 
and K. Vergópoulos, La cuestión campesina y el capitalis-
mo (Mexico City, Nuestro Tiempo, 1975), p. 165. Chayanov 
made exactly the same observation: "...we take the motiva-
tion of the peasant's economic activity not as that of an 
entrepreneur who as a result of investment of his capital 
receives the difference between gross income and produc-
tion overheads, but rather as the motivation of the worker 
on a peculiar piece-rate system which allows him alone to 
determine the time and intensity of his work". Op. cit., 
1966, p . 42. 
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systems, and particularly of the historical pro-
cess of formation of relative prices between 
agriculture and industry, which have made 
possible a systematic transfer of surpluses from 
the peasantry to other sectors through the me-
dium of exchange. 
This situation does not apply only to the 
peripheral countries, since it arises in any eco-
nomy (capitalist or socialist) where there is a 
substantial sector involving family producers, 
even the "farmer" type, whose product —to 
quote G. J. Johnson, referring to the United 
States— is supplied to society at 'bargain 
prices ' : "A cynic might even say that the family 
farm is an institution which operates in order to 
encourage the families of farmers to provide 
quanti t ies of labour and capital at rates of return 
which are substantially lower than the norm in 
order to supply the economy as a whole with 
agricultural products at bargain or sale 
prices".44 This is why over long periods the rise 
in agricultural productivity in many developed 
countries has not been accompanied by propor-
tional increases in the incomes of farmers, in 
contrast to what happens in the remainder of 
the economy.45 
This asymmetry exerts pressure for the in-
tensification of family agriculture, which, in 
the "farmer" type, usually takes the form of 
overinvestment and, in the peripheral peasant 
type, that of more intensive self-exploitation of 
family labour.46 
State subsidies, either provided directly 
through the medium of low prices for inputs 
« Q u o t e d by J. Tepicht, op. cit., 1967, p. 74. 
45"As an example one might cite the case of French 
agriculture after the last world war. Denis Céspede has 
shown very clearly the transfers of agricultural values to the 
benefit of the industrial sector. Between 1946 and 1962, 
agricultural productivity rose from 100 to 272, while non-
agricultural productivity rose from 100 to 189.2. Neverthe-
less, over the same period the per capita income of the 
active .population rose from 100 to 167.8 for agriculture, 
whi le for the non-agricultural sectors it increased from 100 
to 205.4. Let us note in passing that starting in 1937 a similar 
situation arose in the United States, where average annual 
growth in the productivity of agricultural labour substan-
tially exceeded that oí industrial labour: 3.8% compared 
with 1.4% for the years 1937-1948, and 6.2% against 3% tor 
1948-1953." K. Vergópoulos, op. cit., p. 169. 
4 f iSeeG. J. Johnson, "The Modern Family Farm and its 
Problems", in Economic Problema of Agriculture in Indus-
trial Societies (London, Macmillan, 1969). 
and products and credit at low interest rates, or 
implicitly through the financing of infrastruc-
ture for which the beneficiaries are not 
charged, represent no more than a form of par-
tially compensatory recognition of this phe-
nomenon 4 7 
3. Articulation in the labour market 
Another area where articulation is expressed is 
the labour market, particularly, though not ex-
clusively, the market for agricultural day-la-
bourers, who can be engaged by the commer-
cial sector at wages lower than their cost of 
survival or reproduction. 
If no peasant economy sector existed, the 
wage bill would have to be sufficient at least to 
guarantee the sustenance and reproduction oí 
the labour employed, in other words the suste-
nance, over time, of the labour force required 
by the process of accumulation and growth. If 
an average rate of profit prevailed in both sec-
tors (agriculture and industry), this would lead 
to higher agricultural pricesj with the conse-
quent chain reaction on wages, profits and ac-
cumulation. 
The fact that a substantial proportion of the 
labour force employed in commercial agricul-
ture (and even in urban-indus trial activities) 
originates from or is more or less directly linked 
with the peasant economy, and that its condi-
tions for reproduction are in part generated in 
the peasant economy, permits a reduction of 
the wage bill by means of the dual mechanism 
whereby wages paid per day worked are lower 
than in other sectors, while payment is made 
only for days actually worked, however low this 
number may be, regardless of the fact that this 
may by no means cover the annual subsistence 
• |7ln order to gain a vivid idea of what would he in-
volved if this asymmetry were to be completely corrected, 
one need simply observe what happened in the urban-
industrial world when the oil-producing countries decided 
to cease subsidizing the energy which they were selling to 
the industrialized countries at prices lower than production 
costs in absolute terms. Oil, like land, is a non-renewable 
resource (though this applies in a more relative sense to the 
latter), and can command absolute rent. The tact that, in 
agriculture, this rent has declined, and even disappeared in 
many eases, is no more than the result of the subordination 
of agriculture to the requirements ol urban-industrial de-
velopment. 
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of the worker himself, and still less that of his 
family. The viability of capitalist agriculture is 
frequently due to the fact that it is possible to 
pay wages lower than the reproduction cost of 
the labour, especially in areas where the differ-
ential land rent (in the Ricardian sense) is very 
low or non-existent.48 
Temporary rural migrations from areas of 
peasant agriculture to areas of commercial agri-
culture merely confirm this interdependence. 
Similarly, in the case of the sale of labour 
power, the possibility of a non-equivalent ex-
change —in other words, the possibility of pay-
ing less than the reproduction cost of the labour 
employed— is a phenomenon which, although 
it is expressed in the labour market, and al-
though it may appear to depend exclusively on 
the bargaining power between the parties, has 
its origin in the conditions of production and 
reproduction of the peasant economy. 
The above is connected not only with the 
fact that subsistence is assured in part by the 
peasant economy itself, but also with the fact 
that the amount of labour power supplied by 
the peasants, as well as the wage levels they are 
prepared to accept, are determined by the 
production conditions characterizing the unit 
to which they belong. In this regard, the further 
the peasant is from obtaining the level of in-
come (in cash and in kind) required for repro-
duction in his own unit, the greater will be the 
number of days he is prepared to work in ex-
change for a wage, and the higher the level of 
intensity with which he is working his plot of 
land, the lower will be the wage necessary to 
attract him away from it, in accordance with the 
phenomenon of diminishing returns. 
The diagram below, which is of course an 
oversimplification of real conditions, helps to 
clarify the above: Here we are comparing two 
production units (A and B), whose average and 
marginal product curves (AP* and BQ', AP and 
BQ), in this example indicate greater availabi-
lity of land in unit B. Let us assume that magni-
4f4We make this qualification because in areas with 
high differential rents which can be appropriated by the 
ent repreneur landowner, he is in a position to secure ex-
traordinary profits which enable him to compensate both 
for the unfavourable price relations and for the payment of 
wages equivalent to the reproduction cost of the labour. 
tude OCxOM is equal to the net reproduction 
income. Unit A, with the maximum possible 
intensity (in other words, using OP working 
days and with nil marginal productivity), does 
not achieve the reproduction income, since 
OCxOP < OCxOM. It will therefore be suffi-
cient to offer a wage equal to OS (=RT) so that 
the peasant will work away from the plot for at 
least PR working days (assuming that the fami-
ly labour available is greater than OR) so as to 
ensure that (OC ' OP) + (PR * RT) = (OC ' OM). 
In contrast, the peasant on unit B, who can 
achieve the reproduction income on his own 
plot (OC • OM - UK • OU) by working OU days, 
will not be prepared to sell labour power unless 
the wage offered is greater than UK. 
U P M R Q 
Working days 
T h e two articulation mechanisms described 
(product market and labour market), though 
significantly different in form, nevertheless 
have a common basis: the peasant unit's capaci-
ty and readiness (for structural, not philanthro-
pic reason) to undervalue its working time with 
respect to the patterns established by the rules 
of operation of the capitalist sector, either as 
labour power proper, or as labour power mate-
rialized in the products which it places on the 
market. 
This capacity is the source both of the peas-
antry's strength, in the sense of a force working 
for its persistence, and of its weakness, in the 
sense of a force working for its break-up. 
THE PEASANT ECONOMY / A, Si-hejtman 131 
4. Break-up, recovery and persistence 
As was pointed out in the introduction, all the 
schools of thought which derive from liberal-
ism (liberals proper, rationalists, positivists, 
marxists and so on) postulated the transitional 
nature of the peasantry, which was regarded as 
a segment of society doomed to disappear 
—some of its members converted into bour-
geois, the rest converted into proletarians— as 
a result of the vigour of capitalist development. 
Peasantries in specific societies were consid-
ered cultural and/or social relics from former 
times. 
Although it is true that the relative impor-
tance of the peasant sector, as a segment of the 
population, has been declining, nevertheless 
in the peripheral countries the peasantry re-
mains one of the largest groups, since it rarely 
accounts for less than a third of the working 
population. If this is a mere transitory phase, it 
must be recognized that the transition has been 
very lengthy. What is more, in some societies 
the influences working for its disappearance 
have been checked, to some extent, by others 
which are not only preventing its disappear-
ance but even, in specific areas and circum-
stances, creating peasant forms of organization 
of production where they did not exist pre-
viously. 
From the political and economic policy 
viewpoint, and bearing in mind the above con-
siderations, it seems more sensible to abandon 
the assumption of transitoriness and take the 
view that for the forseeable future (and for a 
period relevant in terms of policy formulation) 
the peasantry will persist. Consequently, it is 
necessary to undertake an analysis of the forces 
working to ensure its persistence, and those 
fostering its break-up, so that they can be taken 
into account in the formulation of development 
strategies and policies designed to ensure that 
the peasant sector plays a role commensurate 
with its potential. 
In the discussion below, break-up of the 
peasant form will be understood to mean the 
process which leads to the progressive narrow-
ing down of options which would permit the 
family unit to survive using its own resources: 
in other words, loss of the ability to generate a 
volume of output which is equivalent to the 
fund for family consumption and the fund for 
the replacement of inputs and means of produc-
tion. 
Recovery will be understood to mean 
those processes which reverse the above-men-
tioned trend, as well as those which lead to the 
creation of peasant units in areas where they 
did not exist before. 
In general terms, the forces working in 
favour of the persistence, recovery or break-up 
of the peasant sector act on, and have their basis 
in, the basic network of relations between and 
within sectors (between the peasant and the 
rest of society), which we have defined as a 
form of articulation which subordinates the 
peasant form to the national economy and so-
ciety, and whose principal features have al-
ready been described. In other words, these 
forces help to intensify, redefine or restrain the 
elements of asymmetrical symbiosis of a struc-
tural nature which have been encompassed 
here under the concept of articulation through 
subordination. In this sense these forces can be 
viewed as superstructural elements, which af-
fect and are affected by the structure defined as 
articulation. 
For descriptive purposes, these forces may 
be grouped on the basis of their origin, and a 
distinction may be drawn between those which 
stem from the State and its policies; those gen-
erated by the action of the intermediary per-
sons or institutions, or brokers, that represent a 
link between the peasantry and the rest of the 
economy; those generated by the conscious ac-
tions of the commercial sector; and those which 
derive from the dynamics of demographic and 
ecological factors. 
(a) Action by the State 
Since the State is an expression of the cor-
relation of social forces at each moment in time, 
its action cannot fail to be a blend of contradic-
tory forces, even if the resultant of these forces 
is the maintenance of the conditions of repro-
duction of the social whole and, consequently, 
the maintenance of the type of articulation to 
which we have been referring. 
In general, policies which involve sub-
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sidies to the peasant sector,49 such as credit at 
preferential rates, support prices, the establish-
ment of minimum wages (especially if compli-
ance is monitored), and so on, are actions which 
tend to limit or check the break-up of the peas-
ant unit by making possible terms of trade, in 
various areas, better than those which would be 
achieved in free market conditions. 
Agrarian reform and new settlement are 
also, at least in theory, policies which impede 
the break-up of peasant units, and even encour-
age their creation through the subdivision of 
larger geographical units and the development 
of complementary legislation and action to pro-
tect the units created. 
In contrast to the above-mentioned ac-
tions, public investment in irrigation, or in im-
proving communications and prospects for the 
export of produce, has frequently led to in-
creased imposition on the resources of the 
peasant sector —both directly, through appro-
priation of the areas in question by commercial 
agriculture, and indirectly, through accentua-
tion of the (asymmetrical) trade relations in the 
process of reproduction of the peasant econ-
omy— and have thereby increased its vulner-
ability. 
(b) Action by intermediary elements 
Here we are referring to the various types 
of mechanism for intermediation which link 
the peasantry to the rest of the economy and 
permit the extraction of surpluses at the level of 
relations of distribution and exchange. In gen-
eral, these intermediary persons and/or institu-
tions make use both of the possibilities opened 
up by the specific operating logic of the peasant 
economy and of those derived from the lesser 
bargaining power of units from that sector and 
the intermediaries' monopoly (sometimes on a 
very small scale) of the channels through which 
this sector is linked to society as a whole. 
' "We are using the term "subsidies" in the sense that 
the prices or values involved are more favourable to the 
peasantry than those to which they would be subjected in the 
market without State intervention. In no case arc they sub-
sidies in the sense of a return of the impositions arising 
from the structural relations which are expressed in the 
price system. 
The functions of the intermediary ele-
ments have been classified by A. Warman as 
follows: 
(i) Material adaptation of products, involv-
ing a sort of scaling down of what reaches the 
peasant sector as a product, and a scaling up of 
what leaves the peasant sector for the rest of the 
economy; 
(ii) 'conversion of symbols', involving 
'translation' into the peasant language of the 
external norms of trade and accounting, in 
other words, converting units of weight, quality 
standards and so on into generally accepted 
terms; 
(iii) the physical movement of the products 
which enter or leave the peasant economy from 
and to the external world; 
(iv) the mobilization of finance by means of 
which the peasant can be more fully integrated 
in the market for consumer goods or inputs, to a 
greater extent than would be possible if he sold 
his products or labour power himself. 
These types of function make it possible to 
extend market relations in the process of repro-
duction of the peasant economy and to inte-
grate it in the rest of the national (and interna-
tional) economy. In order to fulfil this function, 
the intermediary element "is located between 
two modes of production, handles two types of 
language, two types of social relationship and 
economic rationality, and guides the flow of 
capital towards the dominant mode. He himself 
obtains a profit from all his acts, equally when 
he converts weights into kilos and when he 
lends money for the sowing of onions... His 
success depends on his flexibility and diversi-
fication, on his being able to sell seven dif-
ferent things and accept a chicken in pay-
ment".50 Each of the functions described in-
volves the appropriation of surpluses, and in this 
regard contributes to the break-up of the peas-
antry; however, to the extent that the persis-
tence and reproduction of the peasantry de-
pend on exchange through the medium of 
trade, the intermediary elements contribute to 
its survival, although they exact a high price. 
™A. Warman, op. cit., 1976, p. 332. 
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(c) Action by enterprises responsible for pro-
cessing and intermediation 
Although strictly speaking this phenome-
non should be included among the structural 
components of articulation, we have decided to 
highlight it separately since it is a recent ten-
dency in the organization of agricultural pro-
duction, We refer to the phenomenon of the 
contracts commonly drawn up between large 
agro-industrial or agri-business enterprises and 
the peasants of specific regions. 
These contracts reflect a tendency on the 
part of capital to abandon direct control of land 
and the processes of primary production and 
replace them by financial and commercial con-
trol of a huge network of small and medium-
sized ' independent ' producers, either by creat-
ing a sort of peasantry economically attached to 
them or by "attaching" a pre-existing group 
of peasants, who can be induced to work on 
advantageous conditions which —for the rea-
sons already indicated— business agriculture 
would not accept. This is particularly true in 
situations where the process of break-up of the 
peasantry can only be halted by exploring ave-
nues for labour intensification which involve 
the partial or total abandonment of traditional 
farming patterns and their replacement by mar-
ket-oriented patterns with high unit values. 
(d) The dynamics of demographic and ecologi-
cal factors 
Natural growth in the peasant population, 
which is appreciably greater than the expan-
sion of the already inadequate capacity of the 
remaining sectors to absorb that growth pro-
ductively, is reflected in increasing pressure on 
land, or, to put it another way, a deterioration in 
the land/man ratio, not only in the sense of an 
arithmetical fall but in the no less important 
sense of a decline in the productive potential of 
the existing land. 
In general, this is a force which contributes 
to the break-up of the peasantry, since fragmen-
tation —which is the result of the subdivision of 
plots as a consequence of population growth— 
is an inescapable sign of a rise in the fragility or 
vulnerability of the peasant economy and a pre-
lude to its disappearance. 
The existence of possibilities of working 
outside the plot can help to defer the impact of 
this tendency through 'subsidization' of the 
continued existence of the unit with incomes 
obtained outside it. Within the peasant seg-
ment, the above-mentioned forces give rise to a 
process of differentiation or polarization, in 
which a minority of the units succeed not only 
in preventing break-up but even turn the inten-
sification in market-oriented relations to their 
account and achieve a certain amount of accu-
mulation. 
Another section achieves a sort of equili-
brium between the various forces and succeeds 
in maintaining its conditions of reproduction 
over time with a greater or lesser degree of 
security. 
For the majority, however, the dynamics of 
break-up —which takes the form of a progres-
sive loss of their ability to support them-
selves— are inexorable and can be alleviated 
only by the possibility, which is not always 
available, for the producer or the members of 
his family to obtain incomes from outside the 
plot. 
In socioeconomic analysis of the peasant 
sector, and in the diagnoses which precede the 
formulation of a strategy for its development, it 
is of crucial importance to recognize the type of 
heterogeneity to which the processes of differ-
entiation indicated here can lead. 
In other words, we may, for the purposes of 
description, stratify the peasant segment as a 
function of the magnitude of a specific variable 
within a continuum (land, output, and so on). 
The important distinction is whether or not in-
ternal conditions exist for the support of the 
production unit and/or the landgroup. 
This criterion can be used to distinguish at 
least three important categories within the 
peasant agriculture sector: 
(i) the intrasubsistence segment, or poor 
peasant ' segment, made up of those units 
which need incomes from outside the plot in 
order to attain a minimum subsistence income. 
This appears to be the segment recording fast-
est relative growth in Latin America;51 
r , lIt need barely be noted that rural workers who are 
landless or, rather, who are not attached to a family unit 
which possesses land, are not regarded as peasants in the 
sense in which this term has been used here. 
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(ii) the stationary, "simple reproduction" 
or "average peasant" segment, made up of that 
part of the peasantry whose product is suffi-
cient to cover the fund for family consumption 
and the fund for the replacement of inputs and 
means of production, from one cycle to another; 
(iii) the surplus-producing or 'rich' peasant 
segment, made up of those units which, with 
their resources, more or less systematically 
generate a surplus over and above what is re-
quired for the reproduction of the family and 
the production unit, although they cannot al-
ways convert it into accumulation. Whether or 
not this stratum will lose its peasant status —in 
other words, whether or not it will become in-
volved in a process of accumulation founded on 
the systematic engagement of non-family la-
bour on a substantial scale— will depend on 
conditions which it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyse. 
